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In this paper we discuss the foundations of two recent trade theories linked 
by the role that the space-dimension plays in this kind of models. The 
theories discussed are the Gravity Approach and the New Economic 
Geography. We dedicate much to the explanation of the micro-foundations 
of the gravity equation and to the solution of the Border Puzzle achieved in 
a relevant and innovative paper by Anderson and van Wincoop. Some up-
to-date empirical applications, which test or use Gravity and NEG relations, 
are discussed in order to show how much these two theories are used in 
empirical trade analysis. 
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I. Introduction. 
The space-dimension had not played any role in Trade Theory for a long time. Indeed the Classical 
Theory does not account for it at all, as it focuses on endowment and technological differences. 
Recently, new interest on distance and trade costs has stimulated new research whose results 
contributed to the formation of the Gravity Approach and the development of New Economic 
Geography .   
In this paper we discuss how the space-dimension is taken into account by Gravity Models, and 
study the relation between Gravity and New Economic Geography (NEG). This will take us to 
consider the mechanics of gravity models, their empirical applications, the issue of their micro-
foundations, and the foundations of NEG. Among the different alternative theoretical models that 
could serve for the micro-foundations, we focus on the Increasing Returns of Scale/Monopolistic 
Competition (IRS/MC) model. We choose the IRS/MC model for two reasons: firstly, because this 
model appears to be the most used theoretical framework to micro-found gravity models; 
secondly, because this framework is the same used in NEG and it itself links Gravity to NEG.  
We investigate the relation between NEG and Gravity to demonstrate that they develop the same 
basic intuition in two different directions, and to evaluate the utility of a model where elements of 
Gravity and NEG are included. Such basic intuition is that the space dimension shapes trade 
exchanges by means of trade costs. Gravity models can be very different both in terms of 
theoretical micro-foundations and analytical complexity. Still, conceptually they can be clustered 
in two groups. The first consists of micro-unfounded gravity equations similar to the original 
gravity equation (these are considered in chapter II). The second consists of micro-founded gravity 
equations in the manner of Anderson (1979) (which we consider in chapter III and IV). 
In the first four chapters of this paper, we discuss exclusively the gravity approach in a way which 
is almost chronological. We will review some important papers about gravity estimations in order 
to show the role played by trade restrictions, how this approach is empirically implemented, and 
how gravity models have been improved to address empirical puzzles. The last chapter is devoted 
to NEG. There, we will derive its fundamental relations and we will discuss the relation between 
NEG and Gravity. 
 
II. The Concept of Gravity and Trade Costs.  
A natural incentive for trade between two countries is their nearness. If a country can purchase the 
same product (in terms of utility maximization) from different sources, we reasonably expect that 
it purchases the product from the nearest seller because this minimizes proportional-to-distance 
transportation costs. This is the Concept of Gravity: nearness facilitates trade relations because it 
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reduces trade costs.2 In the first section of this chapter, we discuss how the concept of gravity is 
embedded into a gravity equation. In the second section, we will argue about trade costs and how 
they are included into gravity-based relations.3 We consider only micro-unfounded gravity 
equations in this chapter. 
 
II.A. The Simplest Gravity Equation. 
In its simplest form, the gravity approach is such a natural relation for international trade that 
Frankel (1998) affirms that it can only be attributed to Isaac Newton (Α. 1642 - Ω. 1727). Indeed 
Tinbergen (1962) simply uses Newton’s formula of Universal Gravitation, which entails that 
bilateral trade between two countries is directly proportional to their size and inversely 
proportional to their distance. If we suppose that country j ’s amount of export to i  ( ijX ) is equal to 
i ‘s  amount of import from j ( ijM ), the gravity equation used by Tinbergen is: ,
i j
ij ij
ij
Y Y
M X
D
  
 (1)  
where ji YY  and  are respectively country i and j ’s GDP, ijD is the distance between country i and 
j, and  is a parameter . Rewritten in logs for estimation, eq.(1) becomes:  
ij i j ij ijm y y d            , 
where the small letters represent the log-value of the variables in capital letters in eq.(1) and ij  is 
the stochastic error. This is easily estimated through the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator, 
where the theory-consistent value of the parameters  ,  and   is 1.4  
Even if eq. (1) fits the data well, it takes into account only few variables. The analysis can be 
enriched by including other explanatory variables in eq. (1) in order to measure their effect on 
bilateral trade. For instance, qualitative variables have an important effect on trade that is not 
uniform across country-pairs. In the next section we discuss how their effect on trade is interpreted 
in terms of trade costs.5  
 
II.B. Trade Costs. 
                                               
2 The concept of gravity is clearly embedded in trade policies. For instance, Regional Trade Agreements are always 
established among countries near to one another in order to strengthen their trade relations, which are likely to be 
already high on the mere basis of their closeness. 
3 In this paper we mean for gravity equation: a theoretically unfounded relation; for gravity model: a theoretical 
framework from which is derived a theoretically founded gravity relation; for gravity approach: a method to describe 
trade exchanges through gravity relations both theoretically founded and not.  
4 Silva and Tenreyro (2006) affirm that the use of OLS yields inconsistent estimates when the relation is log-linear and 
heteroskedasticity occurs; this issue is discussed in the third paper of this thesis.  
5 If we consider as qualitative variable the presence of a common language between trading partners, we can check how 
much a common language boosts trade. Indeed, we expect that language diversity decreases bilateral trade because it 
makes trade more costly.  
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The category of Trade Costs is very large since it includes all the costs borne to transfer a good to 
its final user but the marginal cost of producing the good itself. Those are: transportation costs 
(both freight costs and time costs), policy barriers (tariffs and non-tariff barriers), information 
costs, contract enforcement costs, legal and regulatory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale 
and retail).6 Measures of trade costs can be direct or indirect. Direct measures (reported in 
published data) come from two major categories: costs imposed by policy (tariffs, quotas and the 
like), and costs imposed by the environment (transportation, insurances, translation costs, time 
costs). Indirect measures are those obtained through inference from quantity (gravity equations) 
and inference from prices.7 
Measuring directly trade costs is difficult and often inaccurate since the complexity of a measure-
at-the-source approach. Indeed different countries may adopt different definitions of trade costs, 
and generally their sources are so varied that it is impossible to distinguish each source of trade 
cost which is added to the other in causing the final import cost. So it may be easier to infer a 
specific trade cost by estimating a gravity equation in which a trade costs term is included. We can 
infer trade costs due to quantitative variables (such as the distance between trading partners) as 
well as qualitative variables (such as the effect of currency unions -Rose and van Wincoop 2001 or 
Frankel and Rose 2002- language links and ex colonial relationship -Melitz 2002- regional trade 
agreements -Frankel 1998-, etc. ).  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) propose a bilateral trade costs term ( ijT ) which is a log-linear 
function of M observables mijZ :8 
1
( )
M
m
ij ij
m
mT Z 

 , (2) 
                                               
6 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) reckon that on the whole trade costs amount to a representative 170% tax equivalent 
for industrialized countries, of which 55% local distribution costs and 74% international trade costs. The latter is 
constituted by 21% transportation costs and 44%border related trade barriers.  Specifically, 1.70 = [(1.55 x 1.44 x 1.21)-1]. 
The border related trade barrier can be decomposed in: 8% policy related barrier (based on direct evidence from Tariffs 
and Non Tariff Barriers), a 7% language barrier, 14% currency barrier, a 6%information costs barrier, and a 3% security 
barrier. 
7 The most extensive source of panel data on policy barriers to trade is the Trade Analysis & Information System 
(TRAINS) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. From a scanning of the panel, tariffs emerge to 
be low among most developed countries (under 5%), while developing countries continue to have higher tariff barriers 
(mostly over 10%). Evidence for NTBs shows that these are basically price and quality control measures, whose use is 
concentrated in few sectors in most economies. TRAINS reports sectoral NTBs coverage ratios for U.S., E.U., Japan and 
Canada for 1999. NTBs are widely used by developed countries in food products, textiles/apparel, wood and wood 
products, and in some other areas of manufacturing. The products involved are quite significant in the trade of 
developing countries but also somewhat significant in the trade of developed countries with each other. Price 
comparison measures confirm the high and highly concentrated nature of NTBs in the agriculture sector. European and 
Japanese agriculture emerge as being more highly protected than U.S. and Canadian one. 
8 There is not concordance if the structure of the trade costs term should be multiplicative, as supposed, or additive as 
Hummels (2001) suggests.  
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where mmijZ
)( is equal to one plus the ad-valorem equivalent tax of the trade cost. Then we add ijT  
(right hand side of eq.(2)) to the right hand side of eq.(1), so we obtain an augmented gravity 
equation in which a trade costs term is included and log-linearity is preserved: 
1
( )
M
i j m
ij ij ij
mij
mY YM X Z
D


    , in logs: (3) 
1
1 ... ... .
m M
ij ij i j ij ij m ij M ijm x y y d z z z                           
The dummy variable mijZ is equal to 1 when (in a given pair) both countries belong to the same 
regional group, 0 otherwise. The estimate of its coefficient ( mˆ ) measures how much trade within 
each region can be attributed to the specific mth regional effect.9  
 
II.C. An Application of the Simplest Gravity Equation: Currency Unions boost Growth. 
Frankel and Rose (2002) study if and in which way currency unions boost economic growth. 
According to economic theory, currency unions have a positive impact on growth because they 
represent an ultimate credible commitment to non inflationary monetary policies. Frankel and 
Rose (2002) refute this thesis proving that the effect of currency unions on growth works through 
trade: a currency union guaranties stability and ease trade relations among its members, the 
increase in trade makes the country to grow through a positive effect on both demand and supply 
side.  
We discuss Frankel and Rose’s paper because it is a good example of the potentialities of the 
gravity approach when one tries to quantify the effect of qualitative and quantitative variables 
upon trade. In Frankel and Rose’s paper this is achieved through the extension of the Trade Costs 
term as indicated in eq. (3). They employ a two-step strategy to achieve this result: firstly, they 
measure the positive relation between currency unions and trade, secondly, they estimate the 
impact of trade on growth. Furthermore, they prove that there is not a direct effect of currency 
unions on growth on the mere basis of increased credibility.10 We now present the main results in 
Frankel and Rose (2002) explaining how they are achieved in accordance with the Gravity 
Approach.  
 
 
                                               
9 Common coefficients can be imposed in the cost function. They would involve the constancy of an effect across 
different trading partners. For instance, the effect of membership in a custom union (or of speaking the same language) 
on trade may be assumed to be uniform for all its members. 
10 The econometrics used is OLS and Instrumental Variables Estimator (IVE); the IVE is used since endogeneity arises 
among the regressors. Indeed, whatever proxy used for trade, it is likely to be simultaneous with the growth variable. 
The data sample is a panel data for almost 8,000 country-pair observations at five years interval from 1970 through 1995.  
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Currency Unions increase Trade. 
The effect of currency unions on trade is quantified through a gravity equation where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of bilateral trade. Frankel and Rose’s estimation output is 
reported in Table 3 in the Appendix, each column represents a gravity equation which includes a 
different number of regressors. Interest is focused on the coefficient of the “Currency Union“ 
dummy variable which is around 1.6 across the different estimations. By considering the value in 
the second column, the estimated coefficient in level (e1.22 = 3.38) implies that the presence of a 
currency union increases trade flows by almost three and half times; in absolute terms, this seems 
a very high effect and recalls the border puzzle from McCallum (1995).11 
 
Currency Unions boost Openness. 
Usually, Regional Trade Agreements are assessed positively if they cause trade creation and not 
trade diversion. Indeed, trade diverted from a cheaper (non member of the block) towards a more 
expensive trade partner (member of the block) causes RTAs not to be beneficial. Frankel and Rose 
(2002) test this hypothesis through the dummy variable “Currency Union/Non Union” (which is 
equal to 1 when just one of the two countries in the pair belongs to the union), their aim is to test if 
member countries’ trade with non member countries worsens after the creation of the Currency  
Union, namely if trade diversion occurs. The coefficient of the dummy is 0.37 which means that 
Currency Unions do not cause trade diversion but increase trade between members and non-
members of the 44%. Then, Currency Unions boost openness in general. 
 
Trade increases National Income. 
The final step in Frankel and Rose’s analysis is to test the correlation between openness and GDP 
per capita growth. This involves a serious problem of simultaneity between the dependent 
variable and the Trade variable, then the Instrumental Variable Estimator is necessary. Frankel and 
Rose instrument the Trade variable with the gravity equation estimated at the first step. Indeed, 
variables such as Distance, Population, Common Border and Common Language are plausibly 
exogenous and highly correlated with trade so being good instrumental variables.12 The equation 
which they estimate is:  
                                               
11 In McCallum (1995) trade flows among the Canadian provinces are 12 to 22 times more than trade between Canadian 
provinces and U.S. states; we will discuss the border puzzle afterwards. However, Frankel and Rose suggest that one 
reason for such a higher trade among the Canadian provinces is that they are part of a common federation which uses 
the same currency, while U.S.-Canada trade requires currency exchanges. 
12 They proceed sequentially. At first they estimate bilateral trade using the exogenous regressors provided by the 
gravity model, then they aggregate the exponential of fitted data across a country’s trade partners to create a prediction 
of its overall trade. In the second stage, they use this predicted trade as an instrument for actual trade in the Output 
equation (4) to estimate the influence of trade on output. 
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90, 0 1 2 3 90,
4 5 6 7 8 70,
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    
    
     
 (4) 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of country i’s GDP per capita at the end of 1990 
(measured in PPP), while the regressors are respectively: “Pop”, country i ‘s population; “Area”, a 
measure of country i ’s size; “([X+M]/Y)”, openness to trade where X is aggregate exports and M 
is aggregate imports; “(I/Y)”, normalised investment; “n”, population growth rate; “School1 and 
School2”, estimates of human capital investment based respectively on primary and secondary 
schooling enrolment rates; “  70,/ iY Pop ”, country i ‘ s GDP per capita at the end of 1970. The 
alphas denote coefficients and u is the disturb term, the coefficient of interest is 3 . We report 
Frankel and Rose’s estimations of eq.(4) when different regressors are included in Table 4 in the 
Appendix. OLS estimates show that 3  is positive, statistically significant and economically large 
whether or  not controls are included (0.33 with, 0.79 without). A coefficient of 0.33 indicates that 
holding constant for 1970 income, income in 1990 was 0.3% higher for every 1% increase in the 
trade-GDP ratio.13  
 
As shown by Frankel and Rose (2002), the gravity approach has great potentialities in terms of 
policy analysis even when the gravity equation considered is of the simplest form and 
interpretation. In the following sections we will show how the insights from gravity analysis are 
much more when economic theory is behind the gravity equation. 
 
III. Micro-founded Gravity Models and the Identification issue.  
Eq. (1) and eq. (3) are not linked to any trade theory.14 Consequently, they do not explain but just 
quantify trade flows. Furthermore, we assumed them as true macroeconomic relations without a 
formal derivation through a utility maximization procedure; both are not micro-founded. These 
drawbacks cause equations such as (1) and (3) to be old-fashioned (micro-foundation issue) and 
useful only to describe bilateral trade but not to identify what causes it (identification issue). 
Hence, the Identification issue of the gravity equation is a concept different from its Micro-
Foundation. Although, this difference is not relevant in practical terms because when we micro-
found the gravity approach we derive a gravity relation from a theory which includes a motivation 
                                               
13 The IVE output is displayed in Table 4. The effect is respectively 0.33 with controls and 1.22 without. As regards 
Currency Unions, Frankel and Rose’s results make clear in a very simple way that: i) currency unions stimulate trade, ii) 
it matters with whom one enters a currency union (results for this are not reported here), iii) the propulsive effect on 
trade relies on size, proximity and other linkages. The estimates show that every one percent increase in trade (relative to 
GDP) raises income per capita by roughly 1/3 of a per cent over 20-year period. 
14 For instance, they do no account for comparative advantages due to different productivities (Ricardian model) or 
different factor endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin model). Moreover, gravity equations describe bilateral trade between two 
countries, while neoclassical trade models study a country’s relations with the rest of the world.  
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for trade. As a result, the gravity equation is contemporaneously micro-founded and identified. 
For this reason, hereinafter when we use the term Identification, we mean both the proper 
identification aspect (what causes the observed pattern of trade) and the micro-foundation one 
(derivation of a gravity relation through a utility maximization procedure).  
The attempts to identify gravity equations have been many and reasonably successful. Probably 
the first micro-founded gravity relation is due to Anderson (1979), with further developments by 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989). In the following section we discuss the derivation of a gravity relation in a 
typical IRS/MC setting. In the last section of this chapter we discuss a paper which tackles the 
identification problem from an empirical perspective. 
 
III.A. Micro-Foundations. 
Theory-based equations for bilateral trade are obtained in a wide class of models, in which the 
allocation of trade across countries may be analyzed separately from the allocation of production 
and consumption within countries. These models are said to be trade separable. Trade separability is 
built on the assumption of separable preferences and technology. The class of trade separable 
models yields gravity relations without any further assumption about what specific model 
accounts for the observed output structure and output allocation. Bilateral trade is determined in 
conditional general equilibrium whereby product markets for each good produced in each country 
clear conditional on the allocations. Three additional assumptions are made to derive gravity 
relations: CES preferences, an identical aggregator for each variety distinguished by country of 
origin, and ad-valorem equivalents of trade costs not depending upon the quantity of trade.15 
We discuss the micro-foundation of the gravity approach on the basis of the IRS/MC model by 
considering demand-side and supply-side micro-foundations separately (Harrington 2001).16 
Supply–side micro-foundations concern the conditions characterizing the market structure and firms’ 
output decisions on the base of the maximization of their profit function. Those are:  
i) Perfect Specialization. Every country specializes in the production of some varieties of a good. 
Varieties are partially substitutable and trade is of the intra-industry kind (Armington’s 
assumption, 1969).  
                                               
15 The assumption of products differentiated symmetrically by country of origin has became associated with Armington 
(1969). Anderson (1979) uses it adopting a linear expenditure system, in which the preferences for a variety are assumed 
to be homothetic and uniform across importing countries. 
16 Even though the IRS/MC model suits the gravity approach well, this does not mean that it is the only one. Indeed, 
Deardorff (1998) shows how to derive gravity relations from a Heckscher-Ohlin framework (where we recall that 
constant returns of scale and perfect competition hold). His aim is to show that the empirical success of the gravity 
approach does not necessarily support the IRS/MC model more than a Heckscher-Ohlin based pattern of trade. In the 
next section we discuss Evenett and Keller (2002) where the identification problem is tackled from an empirical 
perspective. 
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ii) Increasing Returns of Scale. In the New Trade Theory this is a result of Helpman and Krugman’s 
(1985) IRS/MC model who formalize it for the zero transport costs case. Firms produce the 
selected variety at an average cost which is decreasing. 
iii) Monopolistic Competition. Firms enjoy market power on the produced variety since consumers 
are assumed to have Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) love of variety preferences. Then, firms gain a mark-up 
over the marginal cost of production that allows them to achieve monopolistic profits, if and only 
if, a no-entry condition is imposed.     
 
Demand-side micro-foundation derives from the maximization of consumers’ utility function, which 
indicates the optimum amount of import that a country should purchase. We assume that country 
i’s consumers have homothetic preferences of the Dixit-Stiglitz kind (so we can focus on the 
representative agent) and demand varieties of the differentiated good.17 The gravity relation is 
derived from the intra-temporal maximization of the following CES utility function:  
   /)1(
1
/1 

 kij
C
j
j
k
i cU , (5)  
where country i’s utility derives from imported consumption of the kth variety from the rest of the 
world (C is the number of countries). Utility maximization is bounded to the following budget 
constraint: 



C
j
k
ijij
k
j
k
i
k
i
C
j
k
ij
k
ij
k
i cTpypcpY
11
, costs. tradewith   (6) 
Furthermore, a market clearing condition for any kth variety is imposed: 
 j kijki XY . (7) 
We continue our analysis only for a one sector economy. Consequently,  we omit the superscripts k 
from now on. We wrote eq.(6) and the following ones with and without trade costs, the reason of 
this appears clearly afterwards. 
In eq. (5) ijc  is country i ‘s imported consumption from j, β is a parameter different across 
countries (that we can set equal to country j’s relative size [ wj YY / ]), and   is the intra-temporal 
elasticity of substitution between goods (which is constant given a CES utility function). If θ >1, 
preferences are biased in favour of home consumption. Prices are equal across varieties but not 
across exporters. This implies that every variety has got the same intrinsic utility. Then, consumers 
do not prefer a variety to another on the mere base of its specific characteristics, but only on the 
base of which country produces that variety. Indeed, the import price is source-dependent because 
                                               
17 An approach which takes to similar results is the Ideal Variety Approach by Lancaster (1980). 
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trade costs are different for different sellers. Since we sum across countries, the budget constrain 
(6) is a General Equilibrium condition which implies that every variety market is cleared. 
By maximizing eq. (5) with respect to country j, we derive country i ‘s optimal amount of import 
from j:  
costs, tradewith  ,
11
w
ji
i
jij
ij
w
ji
i
ij
ij Y
YY
P
pT
M
Y
YY
P
p
M
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






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
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

   (8) 
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ijji pTPpP , with trade costs. (9) 
The variables iij Pp  and  play an important role in eq. (8) and make it different and richer than its 
simplest version (1). Indeed, we stress that eq. (8) belongs to a different kind of gravity equations 
which are derived from the solution of a theoretical model, and not just assumed as true 
macroeconomic relations.  
pij is the exporter-dependent import price which relies on the presence of trade costs. Trade costs 
cause a gap between the import and the export price (Pimp>Pexp); if trade costs are ruled out from 
the model, utility maximization takes to a gravity equation similar to eq. (1). Pi is country i ‘s 
overall price index which has a substitution effect into the structure of the preferences. If trade 
costs faced by i are high on average (Pi is large), then the specific trade costs paid by i to import 
from j will be weighted less, and it will import more from j than from more highly weighted 
countries. This enforces the concept of gravity in this model: a country imports more from its 
neighbours than from farther countries because this reduces trade costs.  
The import price is jijij pTp  , where jp is the price set by the exporter and Tij >1. Trade costs (Tij) 
are assumed to be Iceberg kind of Costs. Then to import a unit of good from j to i, T units of good 
must leave country j since T-1 melts away in the shipping; T-1 is the ad valorem tax equivalent of 
trade costs.18 When Tij =1, trade costs have not restrictive effects because trade is domestic trade (for 
instance, the cost of exchanging different currencies is zero between countries which belong to the 
same currency union).   
The estimation of theory-founded gravity relations (such as eq. (8)) is not straightforward due to 
the presence of the price index and the price term. As regards eq. (8), Bergstrand (1985, 1989) 
estimates it directly by using statistical proxies (GDP deflator) for the variable jP  and ip , and by 
                                               
18 If supply is monopolistic, the export price will be the sum of the marginal product cost and the mark-up. As long as 
the mark-up is invariant over destinations, Tij contains only trade costs. Otherwise the tax equivalent must be interpreted 
to contain mark-ups. 
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breaking the trade costs term into tariffs and transport costs. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
criticize Bergstrand’s strategy. They gauge published data to be inaccurate because evidence from 
observed prices does not reflect distortions in the commodity markets.19 To overcome this 
problem, Feenstra (2004) estimates these trade costs through a regression of the kind:  
log( ) logij ij ij ijT D      ,  (10)  
This is problematic because, by substituting eq.(10) into (8), the dependent variable in eq. (8) 
depends upon  1 ij    and  1    . Consequently, a non linear estimator is required but it is 
not likely to outperform that one which uses published data in the manner of Bergstrand. 
Moreover, eq. (8) explains why countries close to each other trade more, but it does not explain 
why trade between equally distant country-pairs can be different. For example, the pair UK-Greece 
trades much less than the pair New Zealand-Australia despite their distance is the same. Then, the 
model needs to be improved. In the section dedicated to Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) 
paper, we discuss both how the simple assumption of symmetric costs makes simpler the 
estimation of theory-founded gravity equations and how the model can be improved to 
differentiate across equally distant pairs.  
 
III.B. Further Considerations about the Identification Issue. 
Trade economists have demonstrated that gravity relations can be derived from many theoretical 
trade models, in which the causes of trade are not IRS and monopolistic competition. Indeed, 
recent studies by Deardorff (1998), and Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1998) show how to derive 
gravity relations from theoretical frameworks where the causes of trade are 
endowment/technological differences or strategic market policies. This complicates the 
explanation of trade patterns successfully described by gravity relations. In fact, if they could be 
derived only from the IRS/MC model, their good empirical performance would be a clear sign in 
support of that model. An alternative strategy consists in finding a correspondence between 
empirical results and theoretical underpinnings in order to find out what theory supports the 
success of the estimated gravity relation in a specific sample of data. Here we discuss the paper by 
Evenett and Keller (2002) which uses this approach.20  
                                               
19 For example, distortions due to non-tradables, or local taxes and subsides, affect the computation of the theoretical 
price indexes.  
20 The sample approach dates far back in the past. An example is Helpman (1987) who finds that the theoretical 
implications of the IRS model are consistent with data of the OECD countries, for which trade is mainly of the intra-
industry kind. However, later on Hummel and Levinsohn (1995) repeated Helpman’s analysis with a set of non OECD 
countries whose bilateral trade was not expected to be IRS-base trade, but the correlations found by Helpman held for 
the group of non OECD countries as well.  
Then empirical results seemed to be misleading, and even the idea of a sample to sample reconciliation among the 
theoretical models, from which gravity equations may be derived, appeared not conclusive. Although it is worth to point 
out that this kind of papers rely deeply on the data used, then results may be biased due to a misunderstanding of the 
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Evenett and Keller designate four theoretical models which can explain trade flows well-described 
through gravity equations: two models of perfect specialization and, innovatively, two of imperfect 
specialization. The two models of perfect specialization are the Multicone Heckscher-Ohlin model and 
the IRS/MC model. In the former, factor endowment differences are supposed to be large and the 
assumption of constant return of scale (CRS) holds. This model explains a kind of trade where 
products traded differ in their factor requirements, therefore inter-industry trade is expected. In 
the latter, there is no account for factor endowment differences and the assumption of Increasing 
Returns of Scale (IRS) holds. This model explains a kind of trade where countries specialize in the 
production of varieties, therefore intra-industry trade is expected.21  
The two models of imperfect specialization are the IRS/Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Pure 
Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model. In both models the degree of specialization is a function of relative 
factor abundance, a key exogenous variable. Imagining these four models as points on a line, the 
more a model predicts specialization of production, the more it is located rightwards. Then, the 
models which predicts no specialization at all lie on the left hand-side extreme, while the models 
which predict complete specialization lie on the right hand side; see Figure 1. We highlight that 
specialization of production determines trade to be either of the Intra-Industry or of the Inter-
Industry kind.  
 
 
       Figure 1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evenett and Keller’s procedure consists in writing a gravity equation conform to each of the four 
theoretical models. After that, they estimate all the different equations on the same data sample 
and assess which one fits better the data. A description of the models tested by Evenett and Keller 
follows: 
                                                                                                                                                            
data or their bad quality. This is why the contradiction emerging from Helpman (1987), and Hummel and Levinsohn 
(1995) has not discredited this approach. 
21 We point out that the gravity equations used by Evenett and Keller are similar to gravity equation (1), and not to 
equation (7). However, we decided to insert this topic in this section because we treat the micro-foundations on the basis 
of the IRS/MC model here and not elsewhere. In fact, we discuss Evenett and Keller’s paper for their contribution to a 
better understanding of how gravity models can be used to find the cause of observed trade patterns.    
MAX MIN 
Pure Unic. 
Heck.-Ohlin  
Model 
IRS/Unic. 
H-O Model 
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Specialization of production 
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A) Perfect Specialization of Production: IRS/MC model (Helpman and Krugman 1985) - Ms. 
The model is a two countries (i and j), two products (X and Z produced in differentiated varieties) 
model where perfect specialization of production and IRS hold. The gravity equation for this 
model is the simplest one:  
i j
ij
w
YY
M
Y
 .  (11) 
B) Perfect Specialization of Production: Multicone Heckscher-Ohlin model - Ms. 
Evenett and Keller affirm that eq. (11) can be derived even from a Heckscher-Ohlin framework 
when factor endowment differences are so large that countries’ relative endowments lie outside 
the cone of diversification.22 Then, when they estimate eq. (11) over a data sample of countries 
which have large endowment differences, the success of the gravity equation accounts for the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. But, if they estimate eq. (11) over a data sample of countries which have 
not relevant endowment differences, the success of the gravity equation accounts for the IRS/MC 
model. In this way eq. (11) accounts either for the IRS/MC or the Multicone H-O model. 
C) Imperfect Specialization of Production: IRS/Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model - MIH. 
In this theoretical framework, they suppose one sector Z producing a homogenous good under 
CRS, and a second sector X producing a differentiated good under IRS. The model is a two 
countries (i and j), two factors (K and L) model. The homogenous good Z is more labour-intensive, 
country i is capital abundant, and )/( ccXcc ZXpZ  is the share of good Z in country c’s GDP. 
Given the assumptions, the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that country i exports only the capital 
intensive X varieties. Country i ‘s share of X varieties in GDP is equal to  i1 , so the amount of 
its production available for imports by country j is given by   ii Y1 . Country j purchases the X 
varieties abroad according to its share in world GDP  wj YY / . Assuming balanced trade, this 
means that country i’s import from j are: 
(1 ) i jij i
w
YY
M
Y
  .  (12) 
For any γi > 0, the amount of imports is smaller than when both goods are differentiated. As the 
share of the homogenous good on GDP declines, the predicted level of imports rises. 
D) Imperfect Specialization of Production: Pure Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model - MH. 
This is the most classical 2 x 2 x 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model (two homogenous goods -X and Z- are 
produced in both countries -i and j- under CRS) in which factor endowment differences are the 
                                               
22The cone of diversification is a fundamental notion of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. In an Edgeworth’s Box, it is the area 
representing all the possible combinations of country A and B’s relative factor endowments which allow both countries 
not to specialize in the production of only one of the two products in the economy (more specifically, in the production 
of the good in which its relative abundant factor is used more intensively).   
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cause of trade. Country i is relatively capital abundant and good Z is relatively labour intensive. 
Country i’s import is equal to ])/([ wwiiX XYYXp  , where Xw is good X’s  world production. Then 
the gravity equation is: 
[(1 ) (1 )] ( )i j i jij i j i j
w w
YY YY
M
Y Y
         ,  (13) 
when the capital-labour ratios of the two countries converge, so do γi  and γj . When γi = γj  there is 
no trade as the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts.  
 
Ceteris paribus, the following inequalities hold HIHS MMM   (11>12>13). This means that the 
volume of bilateral trade is higher when more specialization occurs. Evenett and Keller affirm that 
observed trade flows are unlikely determined uniquely by any of the four archetypal models 
discussed so far. However they expect that, under different circumstances (such as different 
degrees of product differentiation), observed trade is better described by one particular model 
than by the others.23  
They use the Grubel and Lloyd (1975) index to indicate the extent of IRS-based trade (hereinafter, 
GL index), the GL index is equal to 1 when all trade is of the intra-industry kind.24 If they consider 
intra-industry trade, the candidate models are the IRS/MC and the Multicone Heckscher-Ohlin 
model. They expect that the IRS/MC model accounts for the performance of the gravity equation 
in data samples with a high GL index (so indicating that a relatively large portion of bilateral trade 
is two-way trade in differentiated products). While the Multicone Heckscher-Ohlin accounts for in 
those data samples with a relatively low GL index.  
The organization of the data sample is fundamental in Evenett and Keller (2002). An arbitrarily 
chosen critical value ( GL ) splits the data in two sub-samples which are sorted in a bi-dimensional 
way: for different values of the GL index and for different levels of FEDs. The pairs for which 
GLGL ij   belong to what is referred to as the Low-GL Sample, while the remaining observations 
are part of the High-GL Sample (first dimension). Within the high-GL sample they expect a 
substantial amount of trade based on product differentiation and IRS. Furthermore, they sort the 
observations within the high-GL sample in 5 classes according to different level of FEDs (second 
dimension). The higher FEDs are, the lower Intra-Industry trade is. Denoting by V the number of 
                                               
23 Consider cross-sections of country pairs with little specialization due to IRS, but where the degree of factor  
endowment differences (FEDs) increases across countries. If Heckscher-Ohlin forces cause the pattern of trade, they will 
expect more specialization in country-pairs where FEDs are larger than in country pairs where they are smaller. This 
allows them to identify the Heckscher-Ohlin motivation for specialization and the gravity prediction.  
24 Grubel-Lloyd index measures the extent of IRS-based trade over total trade between country i and j. Evenett and Keller 
compute the GL index for every country which experiences a positive amount of intra-industry trade. This is the case for 
2,870 observations; Bolivia has the lowest average GL index (value of 0.0006), while the United Kingdom has got the 
highest (value of 0.1495). 
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classes in which the sorted observations are located, the sample is organized givenGL =0.05 (2240 
observations in the low-GL sample and 630 in the high) and V =5 ( 51  Vv ). Differences in 
factor proportions are lowest for v =1 (more credit for the IRS/MC model) and highest for v =5 
(more credit for the Multicone Heckscher-Ohlin model). The results of the estimation of the four 
archetypal models are:  
a) Perfect Specialization Model: IRS/MC (High-GL sample). Evenett and Keller’s estimation shows 
that the IRS model substantially overpredicts the level of bilateral trade. This conclusion is drawn 
from the estimation of the respective gravity equation for each class v : 
v
ij
w
v
j
v
ivv
ij Y
YY
M   . 
Indeed, the theory-consistent value of alpha is 1, while the estimated value ranges from  0.0116 to 
0.139 (highest value obtained for v = 3). Estimating over the 630 observations all together (all high-
GL sample and not just for one class v), they obtain an estimated alpha of 0.087. Since the 
estimated values of alpha are much lower than their theoretical value, they conclude that the 
theoretical model overpredicts the level of bilateral trade and that there is no evidence for the 
IRS/MC model. 
b) Perfect Specialization Model: Multicone Heckscher-Ohlin (Low-GL sample). In this model all trade 
is in homogenous perfectly specialized products. The multicone Heckscher-Ohlin model grossly 
overpredicts the volume of bilateral trade by the same token discussed above. Evenett and Keller 
assert that “in summary the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model are rejected by the 
data…and that models of perfect specialization do not appear to be important in explaining the 
success of the gravity equation”, page 297. 
c) Imperfect Specialization Model: IRS/Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin (High-GL sample). When country i is 
capital abundant relative to j, the gravity equation is: 
v
ij
w
v
j
v
iv
i
v
ij Y
YY
M   )1(  and vij
w
v
j
v
iv
j
v
ij Y
YY
M   )1(  when country j is capital abundant.  
The estimate of )1( vi  quantifies the average size of the differentiated good sector. This value 
varies by class v from 0.053 to 0.128. Some support for this model emerges since the average value 
of the coefficient is not negative, and higher values of the GL index  (and hence class v) are 
associated with higher estimates of the coefficient as expected. Indeed, the model predicts that a 
higher share of the differentiated good is associated with higher estimates of alpha.  
d) Imperfect Specialization Model: Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin (Low-GL sample). 
The model estimated is the Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model with two homogenous goods and no 
specialization at all. When country i is capital abundant, the relevant equation for this model is:  
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v
ij
w
v
j
v
iv
i
v
j
v
ij Y
YY
M   )(  and vij
w
v
j
v
iv
j
v
i
v
ij Y
YY
M   )(  when country j is capital abundant.  
The median value of the estimated import parameter ( ][ vj
v
iv   ) can be interpreted as the 
difference between the size of the labour-intensive sector respectively in the labour and in the 
capital abundant country. From the theory we expect that v is positive and that it tends to rise 
when bilateral differences in factor proportions increase. The estimated values support this 
prediction.  
 
Evenett and Keller conclude in favour of both models of incomplete specialization. Moreover, they 
demonstrate that the Unicone H-O model outperforms the IRS/Unicone H-O by means of country-
specific estimations of the imperfect specialization models.25, 26 It is to notice that the two relations 
found (positive between increasing trade and increasing FEDs, inverse between relative size of the 
labour-intensive sector and relative capital endowment across countries) fit the North-South 
pattern of trade particularly well. 
 
IV. The Border Puzzle. 
In this chapter we discuss the Border Puzzle (or Home Bias Puzzle) in International Trade which 
originally emerged from the work by McCallum (1995). This will take us to consider the recent and 
relevant work by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who solve the puzzle through the estimation 
of a specific gravity equation. Their gravity equation is a simplification of eq. (7) derived under the 
assumption of symmetric trade costs, it belongs to the group of micro-founded gravity equations. 
In the last section of this chapter, we will discuss how Obstfeld and Rogoff explain the home bias 
in international trade by using the interaction between trade costs and the elasticity of substitution. 
 
                                               
25 We assumed that the differentiated good is relatively capital intensive, then the model implies that the share of the 
differentiated good in GDP increases with the relative abundance of capital to labour. This is tested checking if the 
correlation  between  i1  and  ii LK /  is positive. 32 out of 35 estimates satisfy the restriction of being between 
zero and one, but Evenett and Keller do not find the positive correlation between  i1  and  ii LK / ; this is a 
negative result against a complete support of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
26 Evenett and Keller point out that their results and conclusions rely deeply on the quality of the data used . They gauge 
this as a weakness of their work which is more likely to affect the results for the low-GL sample. Indeed, the low-GL 
sample includes all the under-developed or developing countries (countries with a low level of intra-industry trade) 
whose statistics are not as trustworthy as those of the OECD countries (which are all in the high-GL sample).  
Moreover, Evenett and Keller cast some doubts about the failure of the IRS/Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model. They 
affirm that a world where all countries occupy the same cone of diversification is unlikely, and conclude that the 
rejection of a model in which each country occupies a distinct cone of specification does not mean that perfect 
specialization due to FEDs is irrelevant . In fact, “it leaves open the possibility of a relatively small number of, say, three 
of four diversification cones”, Evenett and Keller (2002) page 311. In a comment to Evenett and Keller, Feenstra (2004) 
affirms that their results depend on having just two countries, otherwise the Heckscher-Ohlin model makes no 
prediction at all about bilateral trade flows. 
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IV.A. The Border Puzzle in International Trade. 
McCallum (1995) studies domestic trade among the Canadian provinces compared to international 
trade between the Canadian provinces and the U.S. states. He wants to assess the effect of the 
border on a region (North America) which is supposed to be very integrated. He uses an extremely 
simple gravity equation -eq. (1) plus a trade term- with intra-provinces trade data and 
international trade data between provinces and states dated 1988.27 McCallum’s equation is: 
ij i j ij ij ijx a b y c y d dist e DUMMY u          . (14) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of exports from region i to region j, the regressors are 
respectively: region i and j’s logarithm of GDP, the distance between province/state and province 
capital cities, the National Trade dummy variable (equal to 1 for inter-provinces trade and 0 for 
province to state trade) and an error term. The estimated parameters for the 1988 and for other 
years are reported in Table 1. The most striking value is the high coefficient of the Border Effect for 
Canada (column 1), which predicts that trade flows among the Canadian provinces are 22 times 
higher than those between the U.S. states and the Canadian provinces. This unexpected high value 
(which captures all the factors restricting trade between the US and Canada, what we call border 
effect) gave birth to the issue of the Border Puzzle in International Trade. Indeed, the magnitude of 
this effect seems to be excessive and not to reflect the reality of the US-Canadian exchanges.28 
Their main criticisms are: first, the estimation from the Canadian perspective tends to overestimate 
the effect of the border because borders have an asymmetric effect on countries of different size 
(particularly large on the side of small countries); second, the use of a theoretically unfounded 
equation (such as McCallum’s) produces biased estimations due to omitted variables. In the next 
section we discuss the gravity equation used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to solve the 
Border Puzzle. 
        Table 1 - Comparison of gravity equations. 
McCallum’s equation for the original  
and other samples. 
Anderson  
van-Wincoop 
Source:  
Feenstra (2004), Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003). 1 2 3 4 
Year of data Sample 1988 original 1993 1993 1993 
Regions included  CA-CA     
CA-US 
CA-CA 
CA-US 
CA-CA   
CA-US 
US-US 
CA-CA   
CA-US 
US-US 
ln Yi 1.21 1.22 1.13 1 
ln Yj 1.06 0.98 0.97 1 
ln dij -1.42 -1.35 -1.11 -0.79 
Indicator  Canada 3.09 2.80 2.75  
Indicator US   0.4  
                                               
27 This is the last year before the enforcement of the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the U.S.A. which was 
effective from the 1st of January 1989. 
28 The term puzzle is used when the prescriptions of a certain theory are not supported by empirical evidence, but 
McCallum’s paper is merely descriptive and not devoted to assess the validity of any theory. Indeed, McCallum simply 
concludes affirming that national borders still matter a lot even in highly integrated regions such as North America. 
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Indicator border    -1.65 
Border Effect Canada 22.0   
(=exp3.09) 
16.4 
(=exp2.8) 
15.7 
(=exp2.75) 
10.5 
(see eq. 17) 
Border Effect US   1.5 
(=exp0.4) 
2.6 
(see  eq. 17) 
Border Effect Average    4.8 5.2 
R2 0.81 0.76 0.85  
Observations 683 679 1511 1511 
Column 1: McCallum’s equation for the original sample.  
Column 2: McCallum’s equation for the 1993. 
Column 3: McCallum’s equation for the 1993 including data of the U.S. states. 
Column 4: Anderson and van Wincoop’s regression for the 1993 including data of the U.S. States. 
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IV.B. Anderson and van Wincoop’s Gravity Equation. 
Anderson and van Wincoop solve the puzzle by using a different gravity equation in which Terms 
of Multilateral Resistance are introduced as explanatory variables. The theoretical framework of 
their model is not different from what we discussed earlier in section III.B., but they use a slightly 
different utility function for consumers in region j who import consumption from i : 29 
  /( 1)(1 ) / ( 1) /j i ijiU c
    
   ,  (15) 
where cij  is region j’s consumption from i , i is an undefined distribution parameter and θ is the 
elasticity of substitution. Utility maximization is bounded to the budget constraint: 
j ij iji
Y p c ,  (16) 
where the import price is ijiij Tpp   (Tij >1 is the trade costs term, pi is the export price). Eq. (16) 
implies that the nominal value of exports from i to j (j’s payments to i) can be written as 
ijijij cpX  . The nominal demand of region i goods by region j ‘s consumers, which satisfies 
maximization of (15) subject to (16) , is: 
1
i i ij
ij j
j
p T
X Y
P



 
   
 
,  (17) 
Pj is the consumer price index, it is: 
 11 ( )j i i ijiP p T
 
  ,  (18) 
The general equilibrium structure of the model imposes market clearance: 
     1 11/ / ,       i ij i i ij j j i i ij j jj j jY X p T P Y p T P Y i
 
 
 
       (19) 
To derive their gravity equation, Anderson and van Wincoop use the market clearance condition 
(19) to solve for the scaled prices  ii p  and substitute them in the demand equation (17). After 
having defined world nominal income as  j jw YY and national income share as wjj YY / , 
they achieve the gravity equation: 
1
ij i j
ij
i j w
T YY
X
G P Y

 
   
 
,  (20) 
where        j jjiji PTG 
 11 / . (21) 
 
Eq. (18) can be rewritten as: 
                                               
29 To derive eq. (5), we used a utility function for consumers in region i who import consumption from j. We change to 
be as close as possible to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
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    i iiijj GTP 
 11 /)( . (22) 
The problem of eq. (20) is that its estimation requires Gi  and Pj  which are functions of the export 
prices. Instead of using an explicit solution for Gi  and Pj (quite complicated to achieve), Anderson 
and van Wincoop employ an implicit solution achieved under the assumption of symmetric trade 
barriers ( jiij TT  ). Then they demonstrate that a solution to (21)-(22) is Gi = Pi , with: 
  j           i ijiij TPP 
  111 . (23)   
Eq. (23) is an implicit solution of the price indexes as functions of bilateral trade barriers and 
income shares. Then the gravity equation becomes: 
 
w
ji
ji
ij
ij Y
YY
PP
T
X










1
, (24)  
which is Anderson-vanWincoop Gravity Equation for balanced bilateral trade. It is a simplification 
of the gravity equation (8) and (20) because it can be directly estimated, given the implicit solutions 
for the indexes ji PP  and . In section IV.C. we will explain the estimation of eq. (24) in more details. 
ji PP  and  are named Indexes of Multilateral Resistance because they measure the overall restrictions 
to trade depending on trade costs; a general raise of trade barriers will increase the index for every 
country.30 Pj has the same effect as Pi on imports from i to j. If j is on average faraway from its 
trading partners (high Pj) as well as i (high Pi) but i and j are close to each other (low Tij), bilateral 
trade will be relatively high.31 On the contrary, if bilateral trade barriers are high (high Tij ), ceteris 
paribus, the amount of bilateral trade will be low. This suggests that countries which are faraway 
from all their potential partners tend to be autarkic.  
Indeed, trade between two countries depends upon relative trade costs (defined as the ratio of 
bilateral trade costs to multilateral average trade costs). If two countries are relatively close with 
respect to any other country, their nearness is an incentive (relative lower costs) to trade with each 
other. This explains why trade between Australia and New Zealand is higher than trade between 
UK and Greece. 
From eq. (20)-(24), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) draw some fundamental conclusions about 
bilateral trade which provide an indirect explanation of the border puzzle. Those conclusions are: 
1) Trade barriers reduce size-adjusted trade more between two big countries than between two 
small countries. This happens because big countries are large markets themselves, so they are less 
                                               
30 Leamer and Stern (1970) note that bilateral trade is indeterminate in the absence of trade costs. In that case, they 
suggest assuming that countries essentially draw their trading partners out of a hat, according to various probabilities. 
31 Note that the bracketed term is small. But to a negative power (θ >1) the lower it is, the higher bilateral trade between i 
and j gets. 
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dependent on foreign demand. When trade barriers increase, big countries succeed to divert their 
production towards their domestic market  more easily than small countries do.   
2) Trade barriers raise size-adjusted trade more within two small countries than within two big 
countries. A rise in multilateral resistance causes a drop in relative resistance for international 
trade. The drop is larger for small countries because they bear a bigger increase in multilateral 
resistance.  
3) Trade barriers raise the ratio of size-adjusted trade within country 1 relative to size-adjusted 
trade between country 1 and 2 by more the smaller is country 1 and the larger is country 2. 32, 33 
 
IV.C. Solution of the Border Puzzle. 
As we said in section IV.A., Anderson and van Wincoop deem McCallum’s estimation of the 
border effect to be too high for two reasons:  
1) McCallum’s estimation is based on a regression with omitted variables: the multilateral 
resistance terms. By estimating McCallum’s equation for the 1993 (McCallum estimates his 
equation for the 1988), Anderson and van Wincoop find a value of the border effect of 16.4 
(column 2, Table 1). While using their asymptotically unbiased eq. (22) for the 1993, they find a 
value of the border effect of 10.5  instead of McCallum’s 22 (column 4, Table 1). 
2) McCallum’s border effect is made greater by the small size of the Canadian economy. Indeed, 
McCallum estimates the border effect from the Canadian perspective (using data of the Canadian 
inter-provinces trade). Consequently the magnitude of the border effect appears excessively high 
when he computes the ratio of domestic to foreign trade. On the contrary, by estimating 
McCallum’s regression with U.S. data (from the U.S. perspective), they find that trade among the 
                                               
32 These conclusions are proved by means of a sensitive-analysis exercise. Given a uniform marginal increase in trade 
barriers across all countries (dTij =dT for i≠j), it is demonstrated that multilateral resistance rises more for a small 
country than for a large one. In fact, the multilateral resistance of the large country does not change a lot because an 
increase in trade barriers does not affect trade within its borders. 
33 The following example makes this statement clearer:  
1st case - Identical Countries: Consider a two-county world economy, where country A and B are identically constituted 
by 51 regions each. Any region is of the same size in terms of GDP in both countries. Under borderless trade, every 
region sells one unit of product to all the other 102 regions (including itself).  
Now suppose that a border is erected between A and B, and that it reduces original international trade of the 20% 
(because every region in each country cuts its exports and sells more goods domestically). Assuming that markets are 
cleared in both countries, domestic trade rises by the same amount in both countries as well as the ratio of domestic over 
international trade. In the next case, we show that this increase is higher for the relative smaller country of the pair if 
country A and B are not identical.  
2nd case - Asymmetric Countries: Consider a two-county world economy, where country A is small and constituted by 2 
regions, while country B is big and constituted by 100 regions (this recalls the U.S.- Canada case). Under the same 
assumptions, if a border which reduces original international trade of the 20% is erected between A and B, region 1 in the 
small country will reduce its exports to the big country by 20 (it sells 10 more goods to itself and 10 more goods to region 
2 in the same country). 
Trade between the two regions in country A rises by a factor of 11, and it is now 13.75 times higher than international 
trade between country A and B. While trade among the 100 regions in country B is only 1.255 times higher than 
international trade (conclusion 3). 
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U.S. states is only 1.5 times larger than trade between the U.S. states and the Canadian provinces 
(column 3, Table 1). The values in column 3 show that the border effect for the U.S. states is 1.5, 
while that one for the Canadian provinces is 15.7.  
 
In point 1 we mentioned the results from the estimation of eq. (24), now we discuss how Anderson 
and van Wincoop estimate that equation. First of all, Anderson and van Wincoop suppose that 
trade costs are a linear function of observables: 

ijijij dbT  ,  
where ijd is bilateral distance and ijb is equal to one if region i and j are located in the same 
country. Then the log-linear form of eq. (24) is: 
jiijijjiij PPbdYYkX ln)1(ln)1(ln)1(ln)1(lnlnln   . (25)  
In this form, it is very close to McCallum’s gravity equation except for the presence of the 
multilateral resistance terms (whose absence biases McCallum’s estimation). Eq. (25) is rearranged 
for estimation:  
ijjiijijjiijij PPdkYYXZ 
   11 )ln()ln()1(ln)/ln(ln , (26) 
where  )1(  , bln)1(   , ijbbij


1
(so that b-1 is the equivalent-tax of the U.S.-Canada 
border) and δij is the dummy variable equal to 1 if i and j are in the same country, zero otherwise. 
To estimate eq. (26) , we need to compute the multilateral resistance terms. As we said in section 
III.A., the estimation of a gravity equation which includes price indexes is problematic because an 
explicit solution for them is difficult to find. As abovementioned, an alternative technique is the 
use of statistical proxies (such as the GDP deflator or consumer price indexes), but Anderson and 
van Wincoop deem this practice incorrect. Thus, under the assumption of symmetric trade costs, 
they demonstrate that the multilateral resistance terms can be solved as an implicit function -eq. 
(23)- of observables (trade costs and income shares) and of the parameter   and . After having 
substituted such implicit solutions in eq. (26), their gravity equation is written as a function of 
observables and it can be estimated more easily. Nevertheless, they need to estimate a system of 
equations (eq. (26) and the implicit solutions for the price indexes) in which eq. (26) is a non log-
linear function of the parameters.34  
                                               
34 Another way to estimate eq.(24) (which is the easiest to implement) consists in using Fixed Effects; Rose and van 
Wincoop (2001), Redding and Venables (2004), and Hummels (2001) use this technique. This is implemented computing 
the variation of trade when country i trades with j (which is our pair of interest) relative to when it trades with any other 
country. In the regression this is done through the use of two dummies: i1  which denotes any indicator variable which 
is unity if country i is the exporter, and zero otherwise; i2 which is unity if country j is the importer, and zero otherwise. 
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The border effect estimate is bln)1(   = -1.65. To obtain an indicator of the border effect in 
terms of price, it is necessary to assign a value to the elasticity of substitution (θ). Estimates for 
different values of the elasticity of substitution are shown in Table 2.35 
   Table 2 – BE for different values of θ. 
Indicator Border Effect = exp [ ˆ /(1-θ)] 
If θ = 5 10 20 
Border Effect 1.5 1.2 1.09 
 
To turn the coefficient 65.1ˆ  into an estimate of the border effect in terms of volumes of trade, 
Anderson and van Winccop need a more complicated procedure than taking the exponent of ˆ  
(what we did with McCallum’s estimation) because the multilateral resistance terms are influenced 
by the presence of the border through the term Tij. Assuming 1)( iP  as the multilateral resistance 
term without the border effect (the denominator of eq. (27) where Tij is only distance since we rule 
out the border effect), Anderson and van Wincoop demonstrate that the ratio of the exponent of 
eq. (26) with the border effect over the exponent of eq. (26) without the border effect is: 
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Eq. (27) provides us with an estimate of the border effect in terms of volumes of trade (ratio of 
trade within Canada over trade between Canada and U.S. with and without the border). For intra-
Canada trade ( 1ij ) the ratio is equal to 4.31 when θ = 5, then intra-Canada trade is 4.3 times 
larger with the border than without. For intra-U.S.A. trade, trade is 1.05 times larger with the 
border than without. This means that cross-border trade is 0.41 times smaller with the border effect 
than without (value in terms of absolute volumes, not from a national perspective). Furthermore, 
intra-Canada trade is 10.5 (= 4.3/0.41) times higher than cross-border trade. While intra-U.S.A. 
trade is 2.6 (=1.05/0.41) times higher than cross-border trade. The geometric mean of the border 
effect is 5.2 (=[10.5*2.6]1/2); all these values are in Table 1 and taken by Anderson and vanWincoop 
(2003). 
                                                                                                                                                            
Feenstra (2004) compares the value of the coefficient of the border effect obtained with Anderson-van Wincoop’s 
approach (implicit price indexes) and using fixed effects. The estimates are nearly the same even in terms of efficiency, 
but the use of fixed effects is much easier to implement and it produces consistent estimates of the average border effect. 
Feenstra concludes that, given its simplicity ,“it might be considered the preferred empirical  method”, page 162. A 
detailed discussion of this technique is in the second paper of this thesis.  
35 Anderson and van Wincoop estimate their model both in a two-country framework and in a multi-country one 
(namely, considering cross-sections data for other country-pairs and not just U.S.-Canada). We review only their results 
of the two-country estimations which allow a closer comparison to McCallum (1995). 
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Anderson and van Wincoop’s results support the theoretical implications of their model (see 
conclusions 1, 2 and 3 in section IV.B.). On the whole, their paper seems to explain accurately and 
to solve the Border Puzzle since they obtain a much smaller (and conform to expectations) estimate 
of the border effect than McCallum’s. 
 
IV.D. Obstfeld and Rogoff ‘s Explanation of the Home Bias in International Trade. 
Even though Anderson and van Wincoop solve the puzzle, a home bias for domestic consumption 
still emerges. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) provide a demand-side explanation of The Home Bias 
Puzzle in Trade. They focus on trade costs and their interaction with the elasticity of substitution 
(between foreign and domestic products) in order to show how trade costs skew consumption in 
favour of home produced goods. Obstfeld and Rogoff use a typical two-country endowment 
model in which the representative agent has to maximize his CES utility function: 
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CH is home consumption of the home produced good, CF is home consumption of the foreign good, 
and θ is the elasticity of substitution. Preferences are homothetic internationally, then foreigners 
have got identical utility functions in C*H  and C*F. They suppose iceberg kind of costs HFT  
( 1HFT  , 1 HFT melts away) and define PH (PF) as the home price of the home (foreign) good and 
P*H (P*F) as the corresponding foreign price. Obstfeld and Rogoff derive the ratio of home 
expenditure for home goods over home expenditure for imports (foreign expenditure for foreign 
goods over foreign expenditure for home goods):  
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If there were no trade costs ( 0HFT ), eq.(29) is equal to 1 and this is the case of no home bias in 
international trade. While if THF = 0.25 and θ = 6,  it is equal to 4.21, this means that the expenditure 
for domestic goods is much higher than for foreign goods in presence of trade costs (namely, there 
is home bias).36 Furthermore, they show that the higher trade costs are, the greater the impact of a 
1 percent reduction in their value on the home bias. This is shown through the elasticity of the 
home bias with respect to trade costs: 
                                               
36 Obstfeld and Rogoff argue that an elasticity of substitution equal to 6 is a reasonable value since it is found in many 
empirical studies. 
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For THF = 0.35 and θ = 6, it is 2.7; this means that when THF = 0.35 a 1 percent reduction of trade 
costs reduces the home bias by 2.7 percent. For THF = 0.25 and θ =6, it is equal to 1.67; then a 1 
percent reduction of trade costs reduces the home bias by 1.67 percent. The elasticity (30) is directly 
proportional to θ, then a high constant elasticity of substitution can explain a high home bias even 
with relatively low trade costs. Trade flows highly sensitive to trade costs is the empirical result 
which we observe both in McCallum (1995) and in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In this way 
Obstfeld and Rogoff explain the home bias which emerges from gravity estimations of 
international trade flows.  
From this insight into the nature of the preferences, we can say that there are two dimensions of 
home bias in the gravity model (see eq. (24)). The first operates through the constant elasticity of 
substitution term (θ>1), since the higher θ is, the higher the home bias gets as shown by Obstfeld 
and Rogoff. The second dimension operates through the Multilateral Resistance Terms because 
higher trade costs imply lower imports from every source. This implicitly makes consumption 
biased for home goods because countries tend to become autarkic in order to save on trade costs 
(we made this point clear at page 20). How these two dimensions interact and in what measure 
each of them contributes to determine the amount of foreign consumption is expressed in eq. (24). 
 
V. Criticisms of the Gravity Approach. 
A common assumption in the majority of macroeconomic models has always been zero trade costs, 
and the idea of a more and more integrated world charmed many economists and policy makers in 
the last decade. But the results coming from gravity estimations, that show simply and clearly the 
important role played by trade costs in shaping the modern economy, have moved many of them 
to reconsider the traditional assumptions of International Economics.37 Nevertheless, the results of 
gravity studies have not always been accepted without resistance, the gravity approach has often 
received strong and theoretically founded criticisms. In the rest of this chapter we discuss some of 
the most important ones and their possible solutions.  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) collect and summarize the main criticisms of the gravity 
approach. These are: i) estimates of the distance elasticity are unrealistically high and have not 
dropped over time (Grossman 1998, Coe et al. 2002) ; ii) there are non import competing sectors or 
non-tradable sectors that only supply to the domestic market (Engel 2002); iii) elasticity of 
                                               
37 Discussing the missing contribution of Gravity in rethinking International Economics, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) 
affirm that one possible explanation is the lack of a relation between theory and empirical work. Indeed, gravity models 
are strictly descriptive and the lack of a theoretical underpinning, or the complexity to catch that one which suits best, 
does not allow turning the obtained description of trade flows  into an explanation of why such patterns exist. 
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substitution between domestic and foreign goods should be different from the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic goods (Engel 2002); iv) in contrast to the predictions of the model, 
the substantial increase in U.S.-Canada trade during the 1990s was not accompanied by a big drop 
in intra-provincial trade (Helliwell 2003); v) the model implies trade among all countries for each 
sector, while the reality is dominated by zeros (Haveman and Hummels 2001); vi) estimated trade 
barriers are unrealistically high (Balistreri and Hillberry 2002); vii) estimates of the gravity 
equation have the unrealistic implication that consumer prices are much higher in Canada than in 
the U.S. (Balistreri and Hillberry 2002).  
For a detailed explanation of the above mentioned criticisms which concern estimation techniques 
or empirical issues, we refer to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Here we discuss some possible 
modifications to the analytical framework of the model in order to tackle only some of the 
previous criticisms. Such possible modifications are: 
1) Possible Improvements to the CES structure. Tchamourliysky (2002) blames homothetic preferences 
to make consumption too sensitive to trade barriers. He affirms that a non homothetic structure of 
the preferences would soften the effect of distance on bilateral trade, so providing a lower value of 
the estimated elasticity. He considers non homothetic preferences by modifying a standard CES 
consumption index, where he adds a constant i to consumption of goods from country i. Thus he 
derives a different gravity equation, where the estimated value of i  is negative and it is 
interpreted as substance requirements which make trade flows less sensitive to trade barriers.  
2) Different Preferences and Technology. In the gravity equations derived so far, preferences and 
technology are the same for all the agents. It is possible to relax this assumption in different ways 
without compromising the simplicity of the gravity approach. Indeed, it is possible to define 
specific preferences for different countries to allow a bias for home consumption or for 
consumption from selected sources. Nevertheless, the effect of a different structure of the 
preferences is not distinguishable from the effect of trade costs in terms of estimation output. An 
example of an augmented structure of the preferences is the following utility function: 
  )1/(/)1(/)1( )/(    i ijijij cU , 
where ijc  is consumption of goods produced in country i by country j ’s consumers. Then the 
utility of the representative agent in country j differs across countries for different values of the ij  
term.38  
3) Fixed Costs of Trade. Some researchers believe that selling into a foreign market involves fixed 
costs. Consequently, firms exporting in a foreign market in the present are likely to continue 
                                               
38 According to Evan (2003), what really matters is the location of the firm producing the good and not its nationality.  
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exporting in that market in the future (Bernard and Jensen 1997, Bernard and Wagner 2001). Then, 
fixed costs (usually ignored in traditional gravity analysis) might explain the missing trade puzzle 
(critic v), because firms could limit themselves to not penetrate a foreign market that is not 
profitable given certain fixed costs (to wit, menu costs). By the same token, a reduction in fixed 
costs could explain trade growth.39  
 
These are examples of how the traditional gravity model can be modified to deal with some 
criticisms. Some changes complicate considerably the gravity approach, but trade economists have 
demonstrated that the model remains manageable. A more complicated supply side of the model 
allows considering firms’ operational decisions (as in the case of fixed costs which limit firms’ 
profitability). The study of firms’ operational decisions from the perspective of New Economic 
Geography (NEG) is the topic of the next chapter. NEG will facilitate the understanding of 
medium-term trade flows, which we believe to be influenced by the dynamics of the 
agglomeration of economic activity. Moreover, we will discuss the foundations of NEG in order to 
show how much Gravity and NEG are linked, and to support our proposal to enrich gravity 
analysis with some fundamentals of NEG.  
 
 
 
VI. Economic Geography Issues.  
The increasing interest about the effect of distance and of other variables on trade, which has been 
mainly studied through the gravity approach, fostered a stream of research on how geography 
affects the distribution of economic activity across countries. It is called New Economic 
Geography. According to us, the link between NEG and Gravity is substantial but not 
straightforward.  
We showed that distance affects trade by means of trade costs borne to move goods across borders. 
Gravity studies have quantified how much such costs affect bilateral trade, but trade costs affect 
even firms’ location as well as countries’ welfare. Indeed, why should country A firms (which sell 
to country B) pay high trade costs instead of moving into country B or establishing a production 
branch in that country? And if they would do so, what happens to bilateral trade flows between 
country A and B?  
                                               
39 Fixed costs are paid by either exporters or importers. Evans (2003) supposes that exporters pay a sunk cost which 
allows them to export to all foreign markets (internationalization cost).  She finds that in the 1992 only 25% of all the U.S. 
firms exported abroad. Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) assume that fixed costs are paid by importers, so firms export only 
to those markets where they find a buyer who accepts to pay the fixed cost.  
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All these questions are linked and it is unequivocal that to understand how medium-term trade 
patterns evolve, we need to analyse location decisions conditional on trade costs.40 NEG models 
explain why some regions attract a disproportionate share of economic activity by using the 
interaction between trade costs and firm-level scale economies as source of agglomeration. NEG 
starts with the observed pattern of agglomeration and postulates a process through which it might 
have emerged, which typically is: producers and consumers co-locate to exploit plant-level scale 
economies and to minimize trade costs. NEG models are basically those which follow the 
approach by Krugman (1991a, 1991b); it is not a case that he is the same author of the IRS/MC 
model. Head and Mayer (2003) affirm that five essential ingredients distinguish NEG models from 
other approaches to the geography of economic activity, these are: 
i) Increasing Returns of Scale (IRS) internal to the firm. NEG models assume a fixed, indivisible 
amount of operational costs which are source of IRS, while they do not assume any pure 
technological externality that would lead directly to external scale economies. 
ii) Imperfect competition. With internal IRS, marginal costs are lower than average costs. Hence, 
perfect competition does not hold, otherwise firms would be unable to cover their costs. In the  
majority of NEG models, the market structure is monopolistic competition in the manner of Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977). 
iii) Trade costs. Outputs and inputs used by firms are tradable over distances, but they incur in 
trade costs. Such costs are often assumed to be proportional to the value of the goods traded. 
iv) Endogenous location of firms. Firms enter and exit in response to profitability at each possible 
location, but they incur in sunk costs which limit their mobility.41 
v) Endogenous location of demand. Expenditure in each region depends upon the location of firms 
since workers employed in a country demand consumption goods in that country.42 
 
Assumptions i-iii) are present in the New Trade literature and they are foundations of the IRS/MC 
model which we used to micro-found gravity equations. Indeed, it is important to stress that 
Gravity (at least in its most used version) and NEG are built on the same foundations of 
monopolistic competition. 
The key innovation of NEG is assumption iv and v, Head and Mayer (2003) state that without 
assumption v) “symmetric initial conditions can be expected to lead to symmetric outcomes, while 
with all five assumptions, initial symmetry can be broken and agglomerations can form through a 
                                               
40 This argument is strongly linked to another branch of trade theory, which is the study of Multinational Enterprises. 
41 The assumption of IRS implies that firms have an incentive to select a single production site and to serve the majority 
of their customers at distance. If plant-level fixed costs were negligible, the firm would replicate itself everywhere. 
42 Two mechanisms for the mobility of demand have been proposed: 1) Mobile workers who consume where they work 
(Krugman 1991a); 2) Firms that require the outputs of their sector as intermediate inputs (Krugman and Venables 1995). 
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process of circular causation” (page 11). Then, by considering all the five assumptions 
contemporaneously, dynamic analysis can show how factors’ movement and profitability cause 
reallocation of production over time (reallocation is the asymmetric outcome). The dynamics of 
allocation is characterized by some fundamental theoretical prescriptions, these are:  
a) Market potential raises local factor prices. A location whose access to major markets and suppliers is 
not impeded by large trade costs will tend to reward its factors with higher wages and land 
rentals. 
b) Market potential induces factor inflows. Capital is drawn to areas with good access to major 
markets for final goods and major suppliers of intermediate inputs (backward linkages). Workers 
favour locations with good access to suppliers of final goods (forward linkages). 
c) Home market/magnification effect (HME). Regions with large demand attract IRS industries, so 
increasing their production over time. This means that the larger of two regions will be a net 
exporter to the smaller region in industries characterized by plant-level increasing returns. 
d) Trade induces agglomeration. In an industry featuring IRS and partially mobile demand, a 
reduction in trade costs facilitates spatial concentration of producers and consumers. 
e) Shock sensitivity. A temporary shock to economic activity in a location can permanently alter the 
pattern of agglomeration.  
The key mechanism at work in NEG’s models is the HME which is triggered by the size of the 
market; this mechanism was formalised by Krugman (1980). It entails that the country with the 
larger market is appealing because it allows the producer to economize on trade costs. If wages do 
not rise to eliminate this advantage, then a disproportionate share of  producers will locate in the 
large market. This mechanism is usually referred to as Home Market Effect. 
In the following section we discuss the HME in details. In the last section we will discuss two 
fundamentals of NEG-based models, which are the Trade-Freeness parameter ( ij ) and the Real 
Market Potential. In both sections we will discuss papers which use both Gravity and NEG to test 
the significance of some NEG’s prescriptions.  
 
VI.A. The Home Market Effect. 
As we explained, the HME basically predicts that large countries tend to attract firms which want  
to exploit plant-level IRS, with the consequence that they eventually become exporters. Models 
entailing the HME overcome Armington’s assumption supposed so far.43 Indeed, in these models 
the number of varieties produced in each country is not fixed because firms relocate according to 
the HME. Krugman (1980) formalizes the HME in a model of monopolistic competition with two 
                                               
43 We have always assumed that the number of varieties produced in each country is fixed with the consequence that 
domestic demand of more varieties causes an import increase. 
 30 
goods: a homogenous good, and a differentiated good produced in different varieties.44 The 
homogenous good is a numeraire and its circulation does not involve transportation costs, while 
the differentiated good incurs in positive transportation costs. There is only labour as factor of 
production, and workers-consumers spend a fraction   of their total wage L in consumption of 
the differentiated good. Their demand of the differentiated good is: 
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Given trade costs, the price index makes consumption of the foreign varieties relatively more 
expensive, therefore it diminishes the volume of trade. Once consumption and prices are assumed 
fixed, and wages are equalized across countries (Factor Price Equalization holds due to no trade 
costs in the numeraire sector), the model is solved for the change in the number of products 
produced in each country as country size Lj rises.45  
Considering two countries (1 and 2) which start as identical, trade leads them to export an equal 
number of varieties to each other. But if we suppose that the labour endowment of country 1 
grows with no change in country 2  00 21  LL  and , the number of varieties in the larger 
country will increase by more than the increase in its size (the new work-force is employed with 
IRS in the production of new varieties). While the number in the smaller will shrink. Since exports 
from a country to another  ijijiij cpNX   change in proportion to the number of varieties (Ni), 
with N1 growing and N2 falling, country 1 becomes a net exporter of the differentiated good. On 
the contrary, if we assume fixed and freely-mobile world labour force ( 0    0 21  LL ), 
reallocation of labour between the two countries will be a likely outcome because, given trade 
costs, real wages in country 1 are higher and workers wish to move in. 
Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1999) test if the HME depends on the type of demanded good by 
estimating different gravity equations. They demonstrate that the HME emerges when the 
elasticity of domestic income exceeds the elasticity of partner income, so it can be tested and 
measured through a gravity equation. The HME is expected to be higher when only export of 
differentiated goods (and no export of homogenous goods) is taken into account. Indeed, 
manufactured goods (differentiated goods) are likely to have low barriers to entry, while resource-
based products (homogenous goods) have usually high entry barriers.  
                                               
44 Davis (1998) and Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1999) show that the HME does not arise exclusively in the IRS/MC 
model, but it arises in a model of reciprocal dumping with a homogenous good as well. Davis (1998) affirms that the 
differentiated good has higher costs than the numeraire one, otherwise the HME does not arise. 
45 Wages are normalized to one, so w*L=L is a proxy of the country size. 
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Using a classification scheme for goods, they sort the exports of each country into categories of 
homogenous, intermediate and differentiated goods. Subsequently, they estimate the following 
gravity equation for each category to check the magnitude of the HME : 
ijijijijijijjiij RmFTALangContDYYX   76543210 lnlnlnln . 46 
 
The estimated values of the elasticity confirm their expectations. The highest HME is for 
differentiated goods (domestic GDP elasticity>1, partner GDP elasticity= 0.65), it has a medium 
value for intermediate goods (domestic GDP elasticity= 0.9, partner GDP elasticity= 0.65), and it 
reverses for homogenous goods (domestic GDP elasticity= 0.5, partner GDP elasticity= 0.8). A 
reversed HME means that exports, as percentage of a country output, are higher when a country is 
smaller than its trading partner. 
 
 
VI.B. Measuring Access to Markets and Prospective Profitability. 
Prospective Profitability measures firms’ incentive to enter a specific market, Krugman (1991a, 
1991b). In the original model consumers’ utility is a CES function of differentiated varieties in 
which the elasticity of substitution θ represents an inverse index of product differentiation. To 
purchase a variety produced in country j, country i ‘s consumers spend the amount:   
iiN
k ikk
ij
ijij Y
pn
p
qp 


  


1
1
1
, (32)  
where iiY  is the exogenous expenditure by region i on the representative industry as a fraction of 
its income. ijp  is the import price paid by consumers in i for the quantity ijq  of product imported 
from j (N is the number of countries which supply the ith market, note that both j and k belong to 
the set of N countries exporting to i), ijp  is the product of the export price ( jp ) times the ad 
valorem trade cost ( 1ijT ) paid by consumers. The value of country i’s imports from all the jn  
firms settled in country j  is: 
11    iiiijjjijijjij PYpnqpnm , (33) 
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 Nk ikkki pnP is the price index in each country.47 It is an average of suppliers’ 
delivered costs to country i which assigns increasing weights to sources that have either a large 
                                               
46 Where Xij denotes the value of exports from country i to country j, Yi is country i ‘s real GDP, Yj is country j ‘s real 
GDP, Dij is the distance between i and j, Contij is a control for geographic contiguity between i and j, Langij is a control 
for language common to i and j, FTAij is a control for Free Trade Agreements common to i and j, Rmij denotes the 
remoteness of j with respect to i, and εij is the disturb term. 
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number of suppliers kn  or good access to market i (measured by ik ). Thus a country served by a 
large number of nearby and low-price sources will have a low Pi, consequently it will be a market 
where it is difficult to obtain a high market share.  
As abovementioned, ij  is a proxy for market i ‘s accessibility to firms from the jth country-source 
that we call Trade-Freeness parameter. Assuming free trade within countries ( 1 jjii  ) and 
symmetric bilateral barriers ( jiij   ), it is possible to obtain an estimate of ij from eq. (33): 
jjii
jiij
ij mm
mm
ˆ , (34) 
where the denominator is each region’s imports from itself. ijˆ  ranges from zero to one, with zero 
denoting prohibitive trade costs.48 The trade-freeness parameter ij  is fundamental in NEG models 
because it is part of firms’ profit equation, whose maximization boosts firms to relocate in the most 
profitable regions.  
To derive the prospective profitability of location j, we have to consider the following fundamental 
relations of the model: 
1
)
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Eq. (A) is the total cost of production for a variety produced in region j, where F is the fixed cost; 
eq. (C) is the export price of the variety, it is higher than the marginal cost of production; eq. (B) is 
the gross profit earned in each market i through the sell of a variety produced in region j. 
Substituting eq.(B) in eq. (33) and summing for all the M markets where it is possible to sell the 
variety produced in j, we achieve the equation for the net profit to be earned producing in each 
potential location j (by selling in the domestic and in all the other M markets): 
   j jjj FRMPc


11 . (35) 
Where the Market Potential in real terms is equal to:  
                                                                                                                                                            
47 Note that the only difference between this price index and Anderson-van Wincoop’s multilateral resistance term is 
ik .  
48 Estimates of the Trade-Freeness parameter for the pair U.S.-Canada and France-Germany are available in Head and 
Mayer (2003). For selected industries, the estimated value is low so meaning that trade cots are high within regions 
(North America and Europe) which are supposed to be very integrated. An over-time analysis shows an  upwards trend 
of the estimated parameter for both pairs, this is likely to reflect decreasing trade costs due to the enforcement of regional 
trade agreements (NAFTA and European Single Market). It is interesting that the estimated parameter is higher for the 
U.S.-Canada pair than for France-Germany where we reckon that a more balanced relation between France and 
Germany has an important role. 
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1 ,  (36)  
or in nominal terms: 
 
M
i iiijJ
YNMP
1
 . 49  
From eq. (35) we understand on which base firms take their location decisions. The more 
competitors are in a given market i , and the lower the access cost of that market is, the smaller any 
firm’s share of the market i will be.50 Then the profitability of penetrating a certain market j is low 
since the small magnitude of the RMPj term. In other words, a large market that is extremely well-
served by existing firms might offer considerably less potential for profits than a smaller market 
with fewer neighbouring competitors.  
How does this affect country j ‘s trade in this multi-country framework? If the RMPj is low, we 
may reasonably expect that country j ’s trade with the rest of the world does not change because 
the intensity of economic activity within its borders remains constant. On the contrary, if market j 
’s potential profitability is high, firms could decide to move into the country. Then, country j is 
likely to reduce its imports from, and to increase its exports to, any other country because more 
varieties are now produced within its borders.51  
Redding and Venables (2004) use the gravity approach and some of the NEG relations just derived 
to test one prediction of NEG, they study how geography influences per capita income by 
applying a two stage procedure. Firstly, they estimate a trade equation from which they construct 
a Market Access term (our Real Market Potential term) and a Suppliers Access term, secondly, they 
estimate a wage equation in which the regressors are these Market and Suppliers Access terms, 
and test the relation between geography and per capita income. 
The Market Access term of each exporting country i (MAi) is the distance-weighted sum of each 
country j ‘s market capacity for all its trade partners: 
     1 1 111j j jijijjji mTTGEMA  , (37) 
                                               
49 The concept of NMP is intuitively appealing and not difficult to implement in empirical works. But the omission of the 
price index adjustment ( 1P ) in the NMP severs the link with the underlying profit maximization problem. Davis and 
Weinstein (2003a) use a variant of the NMP in which they set  ijij d . ijd  is the distance and δis its coefficient 
obtained by estimating a gravity equation. Since the estimates of δ do not differ greatly from minus one, 1/ ijd  is a 
reasonable approximation for ij . 
50 Remember that the product realized in j is sold in i, and that we are evaluating the profitability of market j. 
51 Through the relations just derived, it is possible to explore how firms and workers’ location decisions depend upon 
market and supply potential. Such analysis can be interpreted as an empirical test of the existence of Backward linkages 
(are firms attracted to locations with large demand of their products?) and Forward linkages (are consumer-workers 
attracted to locations with high industrial production?). 
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where the Market Capacity of the importing country j (mj ) is the product of the total expenditure in 
j (Ej) and the price index in j (Gj).  While the Suppliers Access term of each importing country j  (SAj) 
is the distance-weighted sum of each country i  ‘s supply capacity for all its trade partners: 
   i ijii ijiij TsTpnSA
 11 )()( , (38) 
where the Supply Capacity of the exporting country i (si) is the product of the number of firms in i  
and the price which they set . Both in the Market Access and in the Supply Access term, ijT  
measures bilateral transport costs between two countries. 
To construct empirical values of the Market and Supply Access, Redding and Venables need 
estimates of the market and supply capacity. They can be estimated in two ways: either by using 
dummy variables or by using economic measures of supply and market capacity. With the 
dummies, the estimated gravity equation is: 
ijijijjiij uborddistptnctyX  21 )ln(ln  , (39) 
where the distance (distij) and the border coefficient (bordij) measure bilateral trade costs, ctyi and 
ptnj are the country and partner dummy which capture respectively the market and supply 
capacity. The Market and Suppliers Access term are eventually computed through the estimated 
market and supply capacity. The wage equation shows that they explain up to 70% of the cross-
country variation in per capita income.   
 
VI.C. A Proposal for Further Research.  
Papers such as Redding and Venable (2004), and Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1999) (which we 
discussed respectively in the previous section and in section VI.A.) are examples of how Gravity 
and NEG can be used together to check the validity of theoretical prescriptions. But, they do not 
provide us with an example of a unified model in which elements of both theories are included. 
Nevertheless, we believe that this kind of models would be valuable for a better understanding of 
trade patterns. For instance, trade flows could be studied through the intertemporal maximization 
of a country’s utility function (and not through its intratemporal maximization, as seen so far) in 
order to study the dynamic property of the optimum path. Then, sensitivity analysis could serve to 
investigate how the variation of some NEG’s variables (included in the model) affect the optimal 
level of bilateral trade. More specifically, we could study how bilateral exchanges between two 
regions change over time when the Real Market Potential of those regions change.     
We could also check if trade costs lose significance in explaining trade, when we move from less to 
more accessible countries (on the basis of the Market and Suppliers Access parameter by Redding 
and Venables 2004). We expect that the more a country is accessible to any other, the higher its 
trade is. But, are trade costs more or less important in explaining trade between two countries? On 
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the basis of gravity prescriptions, they should be very important because imports of very 
accessible countries (which have a low price index) are highly sensitive to trade costs. Indeed, 
when formal restrictions to trade fall (tariffs and NTBs), it is reasonable to suppose that the 
remaining restrictions (trade costs) are highly significant in explaining trade flows. To check this 
hypothesis, a sample of countries could be ordered in different groups for their degree of Market 
and Suppliers Access. Then we could estimate a gravity equation for each group in order to test 
this prediction.  
Another possible object of further investigation is the explanation of estimated Border Effects 
through NEG and in particular through the Home Market Effect. Chen (2004) made a first move in 
this direction by explaining industrial Border Effect through Industrial Concentration Indices. We 
deem this strand of research very interesting and much more informative than proved yet.52  
 
VII. Conclusions. 
The aim of this paper was to show how space-related effects affect trade relations. For this reason 
we discussed the effect of trade costs on bilateral exchanges, how to quantify such effect through 
the estimation of gravity equations, and the micro-foundations of a typical gravity model. We 
argued about the descriptive nature of gravity models, and we showed that it does not restrict 
them to just quantify effects, but even to understand the causes of trade. We explained the Border 
Puzzle which emerges from gravity estimations, and how Anderson and van Wincoop solve it by 
improving both the micro-foundations of the model and its estimation. On the whole, we 
explained how space-related effects are embedded in gravity models and in the models of New 
Economic Geography, and we pointed out the role they play (or should play) in Modern 
International Economics. 
In this paper we linked Gravity to New Economic Geography even though this link does not 
emerge vigorously in the present literature. We sought to make this link clear by discussing the 
assumptions of both Gravity and NEG. In the last chapter, we suggested ways of using such link to 
enhance trade analysis through a unified model which include both NEG and Gravity. 
 
                                               
52 This issue is investigated in the third paper of this thesis.  
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Appendix 
Table 3 - The effect of Currency Unions on Bilateral Trade in Gravity Model (Frankel and Rose 2002). 
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Table 4 – The Effect of Openness on GDP per capita (Frankel and Rose 2002). 
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